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Voting behavior and public employment in Nazi Germany 
 
This paper analyzes whether the German National Socialists used economic policies to 
reward their voters after coming to power in 1933. Using newly-collected data on public 
employment from the German censuses in 1925, 1933, and 1939 and addressing the potential 
endogeneity of the NSDAP vote share in 1933 by way of an instrumental variables strategy 
based on a similar party in Imperial Germany, I find that cities with higher NSDAP vote 
shares experienced a relative increase in public employment: for every additional percentage 
point in the vote share, the number of public employment jobs increased by around 2.5 
percent. 
Introduction 
To what extent can governments use their economic power to favor supporters or to 
punish adversaries? While a large body of empirical literature has successfully established the 
economic value of political connections for firms, the evidence for voters or more aggregated 
units of observation is more scarce. In this paper, I try to fill this gap by analyzing whether 
cities benefit from having voted for the “right”, i.e. the winning political party. In particular, 
the meteoric rise of the German National Socialist party (NSDAP) in the 1930s, its coming to 
power in 1933 and the subsequently enacted racial and political discrimination, programs of 
large-scale public investment, and expansion of the armed forces create a quasi-experimental 
situation that allows me to identify the causal effect of a city's vote share on subsequent public 
employment. Between 1928 and 1933, the Nazi party grew from being one of many small and 
unimportant radical parties to representing the largest fraction in the parliament, making Adolf 
Hitler chancellor in January 1933 and, together with a coalition partner, achieving a 
parliamentary majority in March of the same year. In the subsequent years, the Nazi 
government increased the armed forces and enacted several laws that prevented Jews and 
political opponents from holding public office. These policy measures in conjunction with the 
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rapid rise of the National Socialists enable me to estimate whether Hitler's government used 
public employment as a reward to those cities that had helped him come to power.  
The value of political connections for firms has been demonstrated convincingly. 
Raymond Fisman (2001) shows that rumors about the health of the Philippine dictator Suharto 
had a particularly strong influence on the share prices of firms politically connected to Suharto's 
regime. Similar positive effects of political connectedness have been found by Simon Johnson 
and Todd Mitton (2003) for Malaysia, Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Atif Mian (2005) for Pakistan 
and Seema Jayachandran (2006) for the United States of America. Other studies compare 
companies across countries: Mara Faccio et al. (2006) show that globally, politically connected 
firms are more likely to be bailed out, and Faccio (2006) finds that political connections are 
more prevalent in highly corrupt, but also in very transparent countries. Of particular relevance 
for this paper is the study by Thomas Ferguson and Hans-Joachim Voth (2008) that shows that 
firms that (directly or through their executives) supported the German National Socialists prior 
to their coming to power experienced particularly high stock market returns during the first two 
months of the Nazi regime: between January and March 1933, connected firms outperformed 
non-connected ones by between 5 and 8% (p. 102).  
The potential benefits of political connections for individual voters have been analyzed 
less. While political connections of firms' executives and firms' donations are often public, the 
average voter's political affiliations and convictions are often neither known to the government 
nor to the researcher, and hence cannot be analyzed. One notable exception is the recent study 
by Chang-Tai Hsieh et al. (2011), who document evidence that Venezuelan voters who had 
signed a petition calling for a referendum against Hugo Chavez subsequently experienced 
drops in both earnings and employment. The peculiarities of this referendum, where signers 
had to sign not only with their name, but also required to provide their address and birth date, 
allowed Hsieh et al. to identify the signers and to match them with data from the Venezuelan 
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Household Survey. However, such detailed data on political affiliations are usually not 
available. A surrogate is to look at more aggregated units of observation such as cities, regions 
or electoral districts. Gary M. Anderson and Robert D. Tollison (1991), for example, present 
empirical evidence that US states with “influential” congressmen and senators (as measured by 
their tenure and their committee memberships) received more public funds during the New 
Deal era. Steven D. Levitt and James M. Snyder Sr. (1995) analyze the spending patterns of 
Federal programs on a congressional district level and find that the Democratic majorities in 
the late 1970s have favored districts with higher Democratic vote shares. Roland Hodler and 
Paul A. Raschky (2014) look at regions and show that in autocratic regimes, the birth regions 
of political leaders benefit more from foreign aid than others.1 
In this paper, I use cities as a “middle ground” between individual outcomes and larger 
units of aggregation. My paper adds to the existing literature by using a novel dataset to analyze 
whether cities with higher vote shares for the German National Socialists in 1933 experienced 
higher levels of public employment between 1933 and 1939.  
In a closely related paper to mine, Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth (2016) 
analyze the effect of public spending, in particular highway construction during the early years 
of the Nazi regime, on subsequent support for the NSDAP. They find that highway construction 
increased support for the NSDAP by signaling government “competence”. My paper 
complements the study by Voigtländer and Voth (2016): whereas they find a causal effect of 
public spending on support for the NSDAP, I argue that causality also ran from 1933 NSDAP 
vote shares to public employment. Their finding of a causal effect of public spending on 
NSDAP support also suggests a potential issue of reverse causality in a simple regression of 
public spending on NSDAP vote shares. For this reason, I employ an instrumental variables 
                                                          
1 Other evidence for regional favoritism in autocratic regimes is presented by Quoc-Anh Do et al. (forthcoming). 
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strategy. In addition to the potential problem of reverse causality, several previous studies 
(most recently Gary King et al. 2008) have highlighted the importance of the post-1929 
economic crisis for the NSDAP's electoral results. While I control for city fixed effects and 
time-varying effects of several control variables, differential unobserved impacts of the 
economic crisis could likely lead to differences in public employment that could also be 
correlated with the 1933 Nazi vote share. In order to address both concerns, I employ a standard 
two-stage least squares estimation. As instrumental variable, I use the vote share of the 
“Economic Association” in 1912, a party alliance that tried to attract similar voters those of the 
NSDAP. 
I find that cities with higher NSDAP vote shares indeed had higher relative growth of 
public employment after 1933: for every additional percentage point in the vote share, the 
number of public employment positions increased by around 2.5 percent. When measured 
relative to the total population, a one standard-deviation increase in the 1933 vote share led to 
an increase in the share of public employment of 45% of that variable’s 1925 standard 
deviation. The findings are robust to including or excluding cities that underwent substantial 
changes in their population and territory during the period of observation, and to employing 
different definitions of “public employment” as outcome variables. Taken all together, my 
findings indicate a significant positive effect for cities from having voted for the National 
Socialists, thus providing evidence that the Nazis did indeed use economic policy and public 
employment policies to reward more loyal cities or punish disloyal ones. In a broader context, 
this is further evidence that governments can have and use the ability to reward their voters or 




In the early 1930's, Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party 
(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP) experienced a meteoric rise from 
being one of many small parties in Weimar Germany to the strongest faction in the national 
parliament, the Reichstag. After an unsuccessful putsch in Bavaria in 1923, the party was 
banned and could only run for the national election in May 1924 by being the junior partner in 
an alliance with the German Völkisch Freedom Party (Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei), 
another nationalist and anti-Semitic party in Weimar Germany. The two parties received 6.5% 
of the votes. They also ran together in the December 1924 election, albeit under the new name 
of National Socialist Freedom Movement (Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung). This 
time, the alliance only achieved a vote share of 3%. Soon afterwards, the two parties separated 
and in 1925, the NSDAP was re-formed. In 1928, it ran for the first time under this name at a 
national election, winning only 2.6% of the votes and 12 seats in the parliament (Jürgen Falter 
1991, Chapter 2.1 and 2.2, Falter et al. 1986, Chapter 1.3). In the following years, the NSDAP 
changed its appearance2 and, benefiting from the deep recession that befell Germany in the 
wake of “Black Friday” (1929), grew stronger and stronger.3 In September 1930, the National 
Socialists gained 18.3% of all votes, a share that they managed to double two years later, when 
they came out of the July 1932 election with 37.4%, making them the strongest faction in the 
Reichstag. They and the Communists held more than half of all seats in the Reichstag, 
rendering it impossible to form a coalition of democratic parties with a parliamentary majority. 
                                                          
2 Originally, the NSDAP had catered to the urban industrial class. After the 1928 election, it instead tried to attract 
middle-class voters in rural areas. In this vein, it changed its focus from anti-Capitalism to radical Nationalism 
(Peter D. Stachura 1978).  
3 For a recent review of key aspects of Germany's economy at the time of the crisis, see Albrecht Ritschl (2013). 
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As a result, the chancellors had to rely more and more on the authority and legislative powers 
of the president via so-called “emergency decrees”.  
With the demise of 3 chancellors (Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen and Kurt von 
Schleicher) within half a year, the associates of President Hindenburg managed to convince 
him to appoint Hitler to head the government, which happened on January 30, 1933 (Eberhard 
Kolb 2005, Part C). The new chancellor was still far from being a dictator. At the time of his 
appointment, Hitler, like his predecessors von Papen and von Schleicher, had no parliamentary 
majority. However, Hindenburg soon dissolved the Reichstag, and in the elections that 
followed in March, the NSDAP won 43.9% of the votes. Together with its coalition partner, 
the national conservative German National People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, 
DNVP), the National Socialists now also had a majority in the parliament. Subsequently, the 
Enabling Act (Ermächtigungsgesetz) was passed, giving legislative powers to the executive 
branch of the government. In the following months, Hitler used these powers to put the German 
states under the rule of centrally appointed “Commissars” (a process commonly known as 
“coordination” or Gleichschaltung), to ban trade unions, and to pressure all other parties until 
they dissolved. By July 1933, the NSDAP was the only remaining party in Germany. With the 
death of President Hindenburg in 1934, the last remaining non-Nazi source of power died, and 
Hitler and his party had now control over every aspect of government (Ian Kershaw 1999, ch. 
10-12). 
Not surprisingly, economic policy was an important item on the agenda of the newly-
appointed chancellor. Already in May 1932, the NSDAP had demanded an “immediate 
economic program” (Wirtschaftliches Sofortprogramm) to address the issue of unemployment. 
In particular, the party advocated increasing employment through large public investments that 
were, at least in parts, supposed to be financed through debt (Avraham Barkai 1988, p.42). In 
subsequent years massive military and non-military investment ensued. Full employment was 
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achieved by 1936, a success that the general public attributed largely to Hitler (Werner 
Abelshauser 1998). However, modern econometric analyses (Albrecht Ritschl 2002, 2003, 
Mark Weder 2006) suggest Germany's economic upswing was caused not by Hitler's policies, 
but largely due to market forces and an international economic recovery that would have 
benefited the country also in the absence of a Nazi government. Public expenditure grew in the 
process of rearmament, but it often crowded out private demand.  
During the same time, the Nazis also enacted several important policies in order to 
redesign the public sector according to their ideas. In 1933, the Law for the restoration of the 
professional civil service (Gesetz zur Wiederhestellung des Berufsbeamtentums) was passed. It 
allowed the dismissal of “non-Aryan” or politically “unreliable” civil servants.4 A similar law 
was enacted for lawyers, and as far as “non-Aryan” professionals were concerned, both laws 
were made stricter with a reform of the Citizenship Act in 1935 that precluded Jews from 
holding public office. While these laws, ceteris paribus, led to a decrease in public employment, 
employment in the armed forces increased. Within two and a half years, the strength of the 
German army increased fourfold to around 400,000 men in autumn 1935. The officer corps 
alone increased between October 1933 and October 1935 by nearly 3,000 men. With the re-
introduction of national conscription in October 1935, the expansion of the army was further 
advanced. The navy and the air force experienced similar increases (Wilhelm Deist 2003, ch. 
II). Obviously, this increased military force required new bases. It is noteworthy that the city 
of Coburg, a small town in Northern Bavaria, with very high vote shares for the Hitler 
movement5, that was labelled “the first Nazi town” in a book by Nicholas F. Hayward and 
David S. Morris (1983), experienced a substantial amount of public construction after the 
Nazi's seizure of power. In 1934, several new military barracks were built, followed by a 
                                                          
4 See Fabian Waldinger (2010, 2012) for some economic consequences of such dismissals. 
5 In 1933, for example, the NSDAP received 55.8%, compared to the overall national result of 43.9%. 
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regional center for the Hitler Youth in 1937. Other projects, such as a new monument to 
remember soldiers killed in action or a “thingstead”, were planned, but never realized (Stefan 
Nöth 2006). 
The new Nazi government also greatly changed the composition of public employees. 
The dismissal of Jewish or politically opposing civil servants is one prominent example, 
women another. While it is a myth that the Nazis drove women out of the labor force en masse, 
they did take action against women in the upper ranks of civil and professional service jobs. 
Women were excluded, for example, from the judiciary, the bar, and (with few exceptions) the 
highest levels of public service jobs. At the same time, however, the number of women working 
in low-level office jobs increased (Jill Stephenson 2001, ch. 3).  
Finally, and particularly importantly for this study, the Nazis rewarded deserving party 
veterans for their loyalty by giving them attractive positions in the local administration and 
related branches (Frank Bajohr 2004, ch. 1). Part of this was to “compensate” the movement’s 
followers for hardships (actual or imaginary ones) suffered during the Weimar era. In addition, 
patronage and nepotism also reflected the NSDAP’s internal structure. According to Bajohr 
(2004, p. 21), the NSDAP had always been “an agglomeration of cliques and insider 
relationships” where members’ relationships with their direct superior and their position in the 
internal cliques were crucial. Such wide-spread insider relationships were particularly 
conducive to patronage: members that had served their superiors well expected, demanded, and 
ultimately received rewards for their services. Thus, while Hitler’s second-in-command Rudolf 
Heß in a speech in 1936 urged regional leaders to take care of the “old warhorses”, local party 
leaders often went well beyond that. In Hamburg, for example, the Gau government decided to 
reserve 90% of all vacancies for salaried public employees (Angestellte) for party members 
(Bajohr 2004, p. 23f.). In Heilbronn, several men were hired by the municipal administration 
based solely on their long-lasting party membership, and one position seems to have been 
 10 
created exclusively for one such party stalwart. Another applicant was told by the NSDAP 
district head that “...as an old party member, you have a salary that is not commensurate with 
your contribution in establishing the 3rd Reich. I will immediately look for a suitable position 
for you” (Susanne Schlösser   2003). Overall, Bajohr (2004, p. 23-26) estimates that hundreds 
of thousands National Socialists received lucrative public employment positions during the 
early years of the regime, often way beyond their training or abilities.  The importance of party 
affiliation and patronage in the distribution of public sector jobs can also be seen in the fact 
that civil servants and teachers are particularly prevalent among the “March Converts”, i.e. 
among those that joined the Nazi party after it had already come to power. Falter (2013) notes 
that the number of civil servants in the party more than quadrupled in 1933 and suspects that 
many of these entries were motivated by the desire to secure or advance public sector careers.6 
It is conceivable that giving local administration jobs to party veterans and removing 
political opponents from office would have increased the number of public employment jobs 
in NSDAP strongholds (where there presumably were more long-standing party members) 
relative to cities whose electorate had not voted for the new regime (where there were more 
opponents and thus more people who potentially could be dismissed). Local folklore gives an 
example for another form of (presumed) punishment of such cities. According to popular belief, 
the independent city of Lübeck7 lost its independence because of its opposition to Hitler. 
                                                          
6 According to David Schoenbaum (1966/1997, ch. 7), the traditional central bureaucracy proved somewhat 
resilient to party patronage, with obvious exceptions such as the ministries headed by Goebbels and Göring. 
However, he also notes that the local level saw a closer union of state administration and party: In 1935, for 
example, around 20% of all State and local offices were occupied by party members who had joined the party 
before 1933. Among city offices, this share amounted to 47%. 
7 Three Länder in the Weimar Republic were merely city-states: Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck, all of them former 
Hansa cities. 
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Allegedly, the town council in 1932 had prevented Hitler from speaking within the city's 
borders, and Hitler took revenge in 1937 by revoking the city's independent status and making 
it part of Schleswig-Holstein. While the overall credibility of this story is rather dubious (see 
Pressemitteilung der Stadt Lübeck 2012), its existence alone suggests that people believed that 
Hitler's policy was driven by such thoughts. 
Taken together, the clearly discriminating purpose of the Nazis' public employment 
laws and the anecdotal evidence suggests that the Nazis, once in power, might have used public 
employment and the appointments of public servants to reward cities and regions that had been 
loyal to them and to punish those that had been reluctant. If this were the case, one would 
expect to find a relative increase in public employment for cities with high NSDAP vote shares. 
Such a rewarding behavior could be due to political patronage, which has been shown to be 
operational in other settings as well8. The party’s policy to give public sector jobs to long-
standing party members and similar decrees in road construction (Dan P. Silverman 1998, 
p.188) indicate that this was also a motive in Nazi Germany. Ideological considerations too 
might have played a role. Jürgen Erdmann (1969, p.115ff.) points out that the Nazis tried to 
fabricate the illusion of a long-standing National socialist tradition, creating a propagandistic 
cult around the early days of the party and the events that the movement's “old guard” had lived 
through. Loyal supporters were given honorary medals like the “blood medal” (Blutorden; see 
Cornelia Schmitz-Berning 1998, p.117f.) for participants of Hitler's putsch in 1923, and cities 
would be given (or adopt with official consent) honorary titles such as “the capital of the 
movement” (Munich, see Schmitz-Berning 1998, p.296f.) or “First National Socialist town in 
Germany” (Coburg, see Harald Sandner 2000, p.157). Thus, celebrating long-standing loyalty 
and National Socialist tradition appears frequently in Nazi propaganda. Finally, rewarding core 
                                                          
8 For example Guo Xu (2017) for the case of the British Empire, Stefano Gagliarducci and Marco Manacorda 
(2016) for nepotism in modern Italy. 
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voters as opposed to marginal ones can be utility-maximizing for candidates in some models 
of voting games, for example when candidates need loyal “activists” (Assar Lindbeck and 
Jörgen W. Weibull 1987) or if core voters are more responsive and less risky investments than 
swing ones (Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins 1986). The evidence presented by Hsieh 
et al. (2011), Hodler and Raschky (2014) and Do et al. (forthcoming) also highlights the 
importance of political and regional favoritism in distributional politics, particularly in 
autocratic regimes and countries with poor institutions.9 
However, it should be noted that a priori, it is also conceivable that public spending 
could be increased in more disloyal regions in order to “buy support” from former adversaries 
or marginal voters and thus stabilize the regime in its early days. An emerging body of 
economic literature has shown that local government spending has a positive causal effect on 
support for the government (see for example Manacorda et al. 2011 and Stephan Litschig and 
Kevin Morrison 2012). Particularly important for the context of my study, Voigtländer and 
Voth (2016) find that areas traversed by newly-built motorways reduced their opposition to the 
Nazi regime between 1933 and 1934. If the NSDAP were distributing public funds and jobs in 
a way to broaden its support base, one would expect to find a relative decrease in public 
employment for cities with high NSDAP vote shares, or a relative increase for cities with low 
NSDAP vote shares.  
 
                                                          
9 Related to this literature, but of less importance for the setting I study, Robin Burgess et al. (2015) document the 
role of ethnic favouritism in autocratic regimes. 
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Empirical Strategy 
Data and Summary Statistics 
 To evaluate whether the Nazis allocated more public sector jobs to cities with high Nazi 
vote shares, I collected data on the number and fraction of people working in such jobs from 
the German Censuses of Occupation. Administered in 1925, 1933 and 1939, they contain fairly 
detailed data about the number of people working in different occupations and types of jobs. 
Unfortunately, the definitions of jobs and occupations and the method of counting them vary 
somewhat over time. The 1939 census, for example, reports separately people working in the 
public administration and armed forces, in teaching occupations, church-related occupations, 
in legal or economic counselling, and in the entertainment industry. The 1925 census, on the 
other hand, groups all of those occupations together, while the 1933 census has a slightly finer 
categorization that at least separates the entertainment industry from administration, armed 
forces, church, and teaching. The ideal measure for the purpose of my analysis would be the 
1939 census category of people working in public administration and the armed forces, but in 
order to obtain a consistent measure of “public employment” for all three censuses, I am forced 
to group several occupations, following the widest definition of the 1925 census. Because of 
this, my measure of public employment does not just include occupations related to the 
administration and the armed forces, but also teaching professions, artists and other 
entertainment professions, and church-related professions. For more details, refer to Online 
Appendix A.  
Although this wider definition introduces additional noise into my outcome variable, 
table 1 provides evidence that public administration proper is the key component and driver of 
the measure that I am using. In panel A, I use the narrower 1939 employment categories to 
decompose my aggregated 1939 measure. As can be seen, nearly two thirds of the people 
working in public employment according to my wide definition worked in occupations 
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belonging to public administration and the armed forces. Typical occupations in this category 
in 1939 include officers, non-commissioned officers and long-serving privates (no conscripts) 
in the Wehrmacht, civil servants in various levels of public administration, and the police (see 
Online Appendix A). In panel B, I decompose my aggregated measure in 1933 into the two 
components that the 1933 census reports separately. Artists and entertainers are only a very 
small component.10 Finally, and most importantly, panel C shows that the variation that my 
aggregate measure uses is similar to the variation in the narrower categories of public 
employment according to the 1933 and 1939 definitions: In 1939, my aggregated measure of 
public employment is highly correlated with the number of workers in the narrower 1939 
census category of public administration, armed forces, and judicature (both numbers 
normalized by city population) and even more so with the somewhat broader 1933 category. 
Thus, while aggregating several census categories introduces noise, the resulting variable still 
seems to be driven to a very large extent by public administration proper. 
 To address additional concerns, I will show that using only 1933 and 1939 and the 
narrower definition of public employment according to the 1933 census leads to similar results, 
as does using the number of civil servants (Beamte) across all sectors, which is available for 
1933 and 1939. I will also show cross-sectional results for 1939 only, using the narrower 
categories of the 1939 census. 
In my baseline results, I will use the data from 1925, 1933 and 1939 and thus the wider, 
but internally consistent public employment definition described above. My main outcome 
variable is the log of the number of public administration jobs. Because German cities 
experienced considerable population growth between 1925 and 1939, I examine the ratio of 
public administration jobs to total population and the ratio of public administration jobs to the 
                                                          
10 The fraction of the entertainment category in 1933 is much larger than in 1939 since the 1939 census groups 
some artists (e.g. actors) with teachers. 
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labor force. While the latter measure is robust to population changes, it is subject to another 
type of criticism: public investment is likely to also have increased employment in other sectors 
(for example due to increased spending on construction or military equipment). In some cities, 
growth in these industries might have outpaced growth in public employment, leading to a 
decrease in the ratio of public employment out of the population or labor force, even though 
the city might still have been benefiting from increased public employment. Put differently, a 
relative increase in one of the two ratio measures might just mean that the rest of the city's 
economy was doing relatively poorly, thereby increasing the share of public sector jobs. 
However, this is not a concern for the natural logarithm specification, which measures absolute, 
rather than relative, increases in public employment. Both the absolute and the relative 
measures therefore have their respective advantages and disadvantages. In practice, both lead 
to similar results, as I show below.  
The advantage of using public sector employment is that most of the respective job 
categories are under the direct control of the central or local government (e.g. the number of 
officers and non-commissioned officers in the armed forces) and less constrained by the pre-
existing regional industry, making them a more natural outcome measure that also has closer 
resemblance to the individual-level outcome measure employed by, for example, Hsieh et al. 
(2011). Data on public employment is available for nearly 300 cities; In particular, it is 
available for all cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants and for some smaller ones that 
happened to be independent cities, not belonging to any other administrative district (Kreisfreie 
Städte). Figure 1 illustrates the geographical distribution of public employment growth over 
the sample period. Specifically, it maps quintiles of the difference in the natural logarithm of 
public employment between 1925 and 1939. As can be seen, increases in public employment 
are spread relatively evenly across the country, with perhaps a small concentration of stronger 
increases in Central Germany.  
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The main explanatory variable of interest is the NSDAP vote share in the election of March 
1933. For this, I use the extensive database on social and electoral variables for Weimar 
Germany compiled by Dirk Hänisch and Jürgen Falter (1990). This database also contains other 
socioeconomic variables that might be of interest when analyzing NSDAP vote shares. In 
particular, I include the Jewish share of a city's population in 1925 and the unemployment rate 
at the time of the census in 1933.11 In addition to these socioeconomic variables, I control for 
longitude, latitude, an indicator for being in the Rhineland and an indicator for being the capital 
of a Nazi “Gau” (see below).  These variables are included to control for potential geographic 
determinants of public, especially military employment.  
According to articles 42-44 of the Versailles treaty, Germany was not allowed to 
maintain or construct fortifications or assembly troops on the left (Western) bank of the Rhine 
or within 50km of its right (Eastern) bank. In 1936, Hitler violated this stipulation by 
“reoccupying” the Rhineland with armed forces. If the Rhineland is also correlated with voting 
behavior, this could create a spurious correlation between public employment and vote shares. 
To avoid this concern, I control for a city lying in the “Rhineland” as defined by the Versailles 
Treaty. Similarly, the territorial reorganization of the former German states (Länder) into new 
units called Gaue might also have led to differential changes in public employment in the Gau 
capital cities. If these capital cities had also been more likely to vote for the Nazis, again a 
spurious correlation might arise. I therefore include an indicator for whether a city was a Gau 
capital in 1938 (Das Buch der deutschen Gaue 1938). 
                                                          
11 For Berlin, the data in the database are on the level of the city's administrative districts. I created an aggregated 
measure for Berlin by adding all districts and boroughs belonging to it. In order to assess the validity of this 
aggregation, I compared the aggregated population to the one from the censuses in 1925 and 1933. Some 
differences exist, but they are well below 5%. 
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 A potential problem is the question of whether a city in 1925 was the same city in 1933 
and 1939, as many German cities underwent changes in their territory and population, acquiring 
smaller surrounding towns and villages, merging with other cities and the like. A prime 
example is Wilhelmshaven, which more than quadrupled its population between 1933 and 1939 
with the acquisition of the neighboring city of Rüstringen. Similar mergers occurred in the 
Ruhr area in 1928-1930. In order to avoid problems due to these territorial restructurings, I 
excluded all cities which experienced a substantial enlargement in their population between 
1910 and 1925, 1925 and 1933 or 1933 and 1939.12 
In addition, I use voting data from the 1912 Reichstag election, for which I have city-
level data for all cities that had more than 10,000 inhabitants in 1910. These were obtained 
from the official election results, published by the Statistisches Reichsamt in 1913. Ultimately, 
I have a sample of 246 cities for the three census years 1925, 1933 and 1939. Because the 1933 
census was administered on June 16, four and a half months after Hitler had become chancellor, 
but still before his large-scale rearmament programs had begun, I usually treat it as a pre-
NSDAP year but will show below that my results are not driven by this. 
In table 2, I provide summary statistics of the explanatory and explained variables. As 
can be seen, both the number and shares of public employees increased from 1925 to 1933, and 
then decreased again. The number of public employees is higher in 1939 than in 1925, whereas 
their shares of total population or labor force are lower. Given the large amount of public 
                                                          
12 In particular, for all cities whose population growth between 1910 and 1925 or 1925 and 1933 or 1933 and 1939 
exceeded the mean growth rate by more than one standard deviation, I analysed whether this large population 
growth was due to territorial gains or changes that made the city grow by more than 25% alone. If this was the 
case, I excluded the city. For details, see Online Appendix B. As an alternative measure, I simply excluded all 
cities whose population growth between either 1910 and 1925, 1925 and 1933 or 1933 and 1939 exceeded the 
mean growth by more than one standard deviation. The results are not sensitive to this, as shown in below. 
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investment and the substantial increase of the German armed forces between 1933 and 1939, 
this might seem surprising. The most likely explanation is that public employment was driven 
up between 1925 and 1933 by general employment measures, used as a means of fighting 
unemployment even before the Nazis came to power. Hitler's predecessors von Papen and von 
Schleicher had already made credit and funding for public employment measures available 
(Anton Golecki 1986, p.XXXIV-XL). Fritz Blaich (1970) uses the example of Ludwigshafen 
to show how cities themselves tried to fight the economic crisis by employing otherwise 
unemployed workers in the construction of roads and sewerage systems. This pattern of a 
strong increase as a reaction to the economic crisis makes it even more difficult to uncover the 
causal effect of the NSDAP vote share using a standard OLS approach. Cities where more of 
these emergency projects were carried out could experience an increase in public employment 
between 1929 and 1933, followed by a decrease until 1939, when full employment had 
rendered these emergency measures obsolete. As an alternative measure of public employment, 
I also use the number of civil servants (Beamte) across all sectors. Data for this variable exists 
for 1933 and 1939, and this measure (which should measure more permanent jobs, but across 
a wider spectrum of sectors) shows a raw increase even between 1933 and 1939. The mean 
NSDAP vote share in my sample of cities is 41.8%, very close to the national average of 43.9%. 
The 1912 Economic Association was a much smaller party. Across my whole sample, it 
averaged 1.5% of all votes, but with a sizeable dispersion; in 191 cities it did not receive any 
votes, while four cities recorded EA vote shares greater than 20%. 
 
The “Economic Association” and its voters 
It is unlikely that a simple OLS regression, even after controlling for city fixed effects 
and control variables, can uncover the causal effect of Nazi support on subsequent public 
employment. The main endogeneity concern in such a regression is the economic crisis in the 
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years following 1929. For example, cities that were more adversely affected by the crisis might 
have been differentially prone to vote for the NSDAP in 1933 and they might also have been 
subsequently those with different public employment shares. The NSDAP vote share would 
then be correlated with the error term, and as a consequence, the estimate of 𝛽 in such a 
regression will be inconsistent. Another problem could arise if public employees themselves 
are more or less likely to vote for the NSDAP, creating a reverse causality problem. Finally, 
Voigtländer and Voth (2016) have shown that local highway construction caused increased 
support for the NSDAP government, suggesting an additional reverse causality problem: 
Voting behavior affects public spending, but public spending (or expected public spending) 
also affects voting behavior. 
In order to address these issues of potential endogeneity, I instrument the 1933 NSDAP 
vote share by the vote share of another party, the “Economic Association” (Wirtschaftliche 
Vereinigung, henceforth EA) in the 1912 election. The EA was an alliance of several smaller 
parties, most notably the “Christian-Social Party” (Christlich-Soziale Partei) and the “German-
Social Party” (Deutschsoziale Partei). Most of these parties had conservative, nationalist 
platforms that denounced both socialism and capitalism and tried to attract middle-class voters 
particularly in Protestant and rural areas. In addition, both the “Christian-Social Party” and the 
“German-Social Party” were openly anti-Semitic (Thomas Gräfe 2012, Werner Bergmann 
2012). The constituent parties of the EA were not strong, and the alliance only obtained a few 
seats in the 1912 election. However, there are strong parallels between the voters that the EA 
tried to attract, and the voters that in 1933 voted for the NSDAP.  
The NSDAP had started out using anti-capitalist and socialist rhetoric, catering to the 
preferences of blue-collar voters. It markedly changed its approach as a result of its 
disappointing results in 1928. After 1928, the party focused more on rural areas and presented 
itself less as a radical force against capitalism but rather as an ultra-nationalist, conservative 
 20 
party that advocated law and order and the fight against the Treaty of Versailles. The aim was 
to attract more middle-class voters who heretofore had been repulsed by the party's more 
proletarian agenda (Peter D. Stachura 1978). This transformation was successful; by 1933, the 
NSDAP had become, in the words of Jürgen Falter (1991, p.372), “a people's party with a 
middle-class belly” (eine Volkspartei mit Mittelstandsbauch), in which the middle classes were 
the largest fraction. Thus, after 1928, the NSDAP presented itself more as an ultra-nationalist 
party for the middle-class, with a particular focus on rural and Protestant voters, trying to attract 
the very voters that the EA before World War I had tried to attract, as well as sharing its 
antisemitism.13 Because of this, the vote share of the EA in the 1912 election and the NSDAP 
vote shares after 1928 are significantly positively related (this is also shown more formally in 
the first-stage results below), so the former can be used as an instrument for the latter. 
The basic idea of this instrument is to use variation in NSDAP vote shares that is not 
due to the economic crisis post 1929 but due to persistent political attitudes of the local 
population such as extreme nationalism or antisemitism.14 In order to be a valid instrument, the 
1912 EA share has to satisfy the exclusion restriction. In particular, the identifying assumption 
of this strategy is that the 1912 EA share does not have an effect on public employment 
outcomes later on, other than through affecting support for the NSDAP. Several aspects make 
the 1912 EA vote share attractive in this respect. Firstly, dating from more than 20 years prior 
to the 1933 election, use of the 1912 EA share should not be susceptible to reverse causation 
problems either from public spending in the Weimar era, expected public spending by a 
                                                          
13 After 1930, the NSDAP toned down its antisemitism considerably (see for example Voigtländer and Voth 2012). 
Still, it remained, in the words of Ulrich Herbert (2000, p.18f.) “a receptacle” for Anti-Jewish elements. 
14 It is for this reason that I do not control for measures of long-term antisemitism that Voigtländer and Voth 
(2012) have constructed and used. If antisemitism led to increased votes for the EA in 1912, this is “good” 
variation that I want to use in my estimates, and not remove it by controlling for it. 
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potential NSDAP government, or the voting behavior of public employees. Secondly, using a 
vote result prior to the economic crisis starting in 1929 allows me to purge the 1933 vote shares 
of any factors from this crisis.  
One remaining concern, however, is that there might still be unobserved factors that are 
correlated both with the 1912 EA share and with the 1933 NSDAP share and that might also 
be relevant for the evolution of public employment over time. Cities with a high EA share 
might be fundamentally different from those with low or no EA votes, and these differences 
might also affect public employment patterns. The absence of such differences cannot be tested 
or proved in a formal sense. However, I can examine whether the instrument is correlated with 
the level and evolution of relevant variables before 1933. In table 3, I run a cross-sectional 
regression for 1925, relating the three public employment outcomes (the ratio of public 
employment to either the population or the labor force, and the natural logarithm of public 
employment) to the 1912 EA vote share. Odd numbered columns (1,3,5) show simple bivariate 
correlations, even numbered columns (2,4,6) include controls. Since I cannot include fixed 
effects in the cross-sectional regressions, I include the natural logarithm of a city's population 
as an additional control to make sure I compare cities of similar size. I omit the 1933 
unemployment rate from these 1925 regressions. There is clearly no relationship between 
public employment in 1925 and the 1912 EA vote share. Regardless of the inclusion or 
exclusion of controls, the estimates are statistically insignificant and of small magnitudes. For 
example, according to the specification with controls, increasing the 1912 EA vote share by 
one full standard deviation would decrease the 1925 public administration jobs to population 
ratio by only 2% of a standard deviation.  
The absence of a correlation between my instrument and the level of public employment 
in 1925 is reassuring, but the identifying assumption of my strategy is not that the 1912 EA 
vote share is uncorrelated with the counterfactual level of public employment, but with its 
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counterfactual changes. To assess this, in columns 1-3 of table 4, I show the results of a 
“placebo test”, examining whether cities with different 1912 EA vote shares experienced 
different evolutions of public employment between 1925 and 1933. Specifically, I regress my 
3 outcomes on the interaction between the 1912 EA share and an indicator for the year 1933, 
an indicator for the year 1933, city fixed effects and my control variables, each of which is 
interacted with an indicator for the year 1933. The results from this exercise are encouraging. 
The 1912 EA vote share is never significantly associated with the development of public 
employment between 1925 and 1933, and the point estimates are small. For example, 
increasing the 1912 EA vote share by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in 
administration jobs as a ratio to total population of less than 1% of a standard deviation of the 
1925 administration job ratio. Even more encouraging, in columns 4-6, when I examine 
whether the 1912 EA share is correlated with the evolution of a city's economy as measured by 
the employment shares of three broadly defined sectors, I again do not find any relationship. 
Between 1925 and 1933, cities with high or low 1912 EA vote shares do not experience 
different evolutions of employment in either agriculture, manufacturing or commerce. Finally, 
in columns 7-9, I look at the occupational class composition of a city's economy, measured by 
the respective shares of blue-collar employees, white-collar employees, and self-employed. 
Again, there is no relationship between voting for the Economic Association and changes in a 
city's occupational class structure.15 
An important question is whether cities with different 1912 EA vote shares were 
affected differentially by the economic crisis after 1929. I provide a coarse assessment of this 
                                                          
15 For columns 4-9, it should be noted that the measures employed differ for the 1925 and 1933 census, as the 
1925 census does not contain the number of people employed in a given sector, but the number of people employed 
in a given sector and their family members. However, such uniform differences in measurement should be 
absorbed by the year fixed effect. 
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in table 5, where I correlate unemployment during the crisis with voting for the EA in 1912. A 
slight negative bivariate correlation is present between the unemployment rate in 1933 and the 
1912 EA vote share, but this is not robust to the inclusion of controls. In addition, when looking 
at changes in unemployment by regressing the difference in the logs of unemployment in 1932 
and 1930 on the 1912 vote share, I again do not detect any sizable or statistically significant 
relationship. 
These results strengthen the instrument's case for exogeneity: The 1912 EA share is not 
correlated with the level of or evolution of public employment between 1925 and 1933. It is 
also not associated with changes in the city's sectoral or occupational class structure. Finally, 
there is also no evidence that cities with high EA vote shares experienced different evolutions 
of unemployment during the economic crisis in the early 1930's. It is still possible that cities 
with high and low EA votes differed along other dimensions, but the previous results seem to 
indicate that such differences, if present, were not very consequential in economic terms.  
Based on this, I employ a standard two-stage least square estimation procedure. The basic 
model of interest is  
(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒33𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷1939𝑡 + 𝜏 ⋅ 𝐷1939𝑡 + 𝛾
′ ⋅ 𝑋𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷1939𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the outcome, i.e. either the natural logarithm of public employment or the 
ratio of public employment to population or the labor force in city i and year t, where t can be 
1925, 1933 or 1939. NSDAPshare33i denotes the NSDAP vote share in the 1933 election in 
city i and D1939t is a dummy which is 1 for the year 1939. The city fixed effects, 𝑐𝑖, will 
account for constant effects of time invariant city characteristics such as being a historical 
regional capital. X is a vector of time-invariant city-level controls, discussed in the previous 
section. To address the endogeneity problem arising from the likely correlation between the 
1933 NSDAP vote share and the economic crisis, the variable of interest in equation 1 will be 
replaced by its prediction based on the same controls and the 1912 EA share: 
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(2) 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒33𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷1939𝑡 = 𝜂 ⋅ 𝐸𝐴𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1912𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷1939𝑡 + 𝜃 ⋅ 𝐷1939𝑡 + 𝜒
′ ⋅ 𝑋𝑖 ⋅
𝐷1939𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
These predicted values will then be used as regressors of interest in the second stage: 
(3) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒33𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷1939𝑡̂ + 𝜏 ⋅ 𝐷1939𝑡 + 𝛾
′ ⋅ 𝑋𝑖 ⋅ 𝐷1939𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Results 
Baseline estimates 
Table 6 presents the results of simple OLS estimations from equation 1. As discussed 
in the previous section, these regressions are based on the strong assumption that the 1933 
NSDAP vote share is exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, which is unlikely given 
the 1929 economic crisis. An extensive body of literature has analyzed the reasons for the 
NSDAP's rapid electoral successes, which socioeconomic groups were more likely to vote for 
the National Socialists and why they did so (see, among others, Bruno S. Frey and Hannelore 
Weck 1981, Falter et al. 1983, Falter et al. 1985, Falter 1991, Arthur van Riel and Arthur 
Schram 1993, Christian Stögbauer 2001, King et al. 2008, Maja Adena et al. 2015, Christoph 
Koenig 2015, Jörg Spenkuch and Philipp Tillman forthcoming, Shanker Satyanath, Nico 
Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth forthcoming). Although some disagreement about certain 
issues still exists, there is a clear consensus that the economic crisis that affected Germany in 
the early 1930's was a prime driver of National Socialist vote shares. If cities that were affected 
more by the crisis were differentially likely to vote for the NSDAP in 1933, the OLS estimates 
will be biased. The sign of the bias is unclear a priori: if cities more affected by the crisis were 
more industrialized and therefore more strongly connected to the communist parties, and public 
employment increased in these cities as a response to the crisis, the resulting OLS estimate 
could be biased downwards. A similar negative bias could arise if public servants were more 
likely to vote for the NSDAP and cities with more public employment experienced slower 
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growth in public employment (for example since they were less affected by the crisis and thus 
did not need large-scale investment programs, or at least only smaller ones). On the other hand, 
if cities that were affected more by the crisis turned towards the Nazis, it is easily conceivable 
that an upward bias might arise.16 With this in mind, the estimates of 𝛽 in table 6 are negative, 
but not large and not significantly different from zero. Taken at face value, this would mean 
that a city's NSDAP vote share in 1933 had no or a slightly negative effect on the city's public 
employment share in 1939. This could mean that if anything, instead of “favoring” loyal cities, 
the new government tried to “buy support” from more resistant cities, for example in an attempt 
to stabilize its power in the early days of the regime. However, these OLS estimates should be 
viewed with caution, and I turn next to the instrumental variable (IV) estimates discussed 
above. By using an instrumental variable that significantly predates the 1929-1932 economic 
crisis, this approach avoids any correlation between the NSDAP vote shares and the intensity 
of the crisis.  
The 2SLS estimates based on the 1912 vote share for the “Economic Association” as 
instrumental variable for the 1933 NSDAP vote share are presented in table 7. As can be seen 
from the first stage result, the 1912 EA vote share and the 1933 NSDAP vote share are indeed 
strongly and, as one would expect, positively related. The first-stage results indicate that a one 
percentage point increase in the 1912 EA vote share increases the 1933 NSDAP vote share by 
around 0.35 percentage points. Thus, the translation between 1912 EA voters and 1933 NSDAP 
voters is not one-to-one, which is not surprising, given that some members of the Economic 
                                                          
16 The exact relationships between the economic crisis in the late 1920s and the rise of the NSDAP are still debated 
in the literature. The most recent study by King et al. (2008) finds that the most adversely affected groups reacted 
differently in their voting behaviour: While the “working poor” such as self-employed shopkeepers and 
professionals increasingly voted for the Nazis, the unemployed turned towards the communists. A priori, it is 
therefore not clear how adverse effects of the economic situation would correlate with the NSDAP vote share. 
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Alliance joined other parties after 1918, in particular the German National People's Party, 
Hitler's coalition partner from January 1933 (Bergmann 2012). 
In panel B, I find that an increase in the 1933 NSDAP vote share of one percentage 
point would increase the number of public sector jobs by around 2.3%, which is a quite 
substantial increase. When looking at public employment as a share of population, the results 
indicate that a one percentage point increase in the 1933 NSDAP vote share is associated with 
a 0.1 percentage point increase in the ratio of public employment to total population. Put 
differently, an increase of one standard deviation in the 1933 vote share leads to an increase of 
around 45% of a standard deviation in terms of the 1925 public employment share. The results 
for public employment as a share of the labor force are similar in magnitude.17 All these results 
are relative results. They show that cities with greater NSDAP vote shares experienced a 
relative increase in public employment compared to cities with lower Nazi support. As the 
summary statistics presented above show, both the number of public employment jobs and its 
shares are lower in 1939 than in 1933. In this sense, my results show that public employment 
fell less for cities with greater NSDAP support.  
The results from table 7 show that high 1933 NSDAP vote shares led to a subsequent 
relative increase in public sector jobs, both in absolute numbers and in ratios of the population. 
                                                          
17 As explained in the data section, the 1912 EA vote share has a somewhat unusual distribution with many zeros 
and a right tail of four cities with very high values. This distribution could mask some heterogeneity in the effects, 
which I further explore in Online Appendix C. Cities with no 1912 EA vote share are important for the precision 
of the estimate, but tend to dampen the effect size. Because of this, the 55 cities with nonzero EA vote share 
display larger effect sizes, but lower precision. The four cities with EA vote shares above 20% are influential for 
the overall results but less so when focusing on only cities with positive instrument values. Removing both 
extremes results in a smaller sample and less precise estimation, but does not change the sign of the results. 
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This pattern thus is not consistent with the Nazi government buying support from opposing 
cities, but rather rewarding its strongholds via public employment.  
In table 8, I provide further evidence that my results are based on government 
discrimination, rather than other economic forces. Here, I repeat the analysis, but this time 
using the metal industry, a sector that contracted during the 1929 crisis and expanded during 
the pre-war build-up, but was not under direct government control. I would not expect to find 
an effect here.18 The estimates are all not significantly different from zero. In the case of the 
ratios of administration employment to the labor force and to the labor force, the point estimates 
are relatively sizable, but very imprecisely estimated, whereas for the natural logarithm also 
the point estimate would indicate a very limited negative effect of 1%. 
 One caveat is that part of the increased importance of public sector jobs could be due 
to supply factors rather than increased demand. In cities leaning more towards the Nazis, more 
people might have decided to work in the public administration or join the armed forces, 
whereas Nazi opponents might have voluntarily left their jobs. While such differential supply-
side behavior is possible, the local or regional governments still would have had to create the 
necessary vacancies.  
 
Robustness 
I now address several potential concerns relating to the findings from the IV 
regressions. As discussed above, there were several city mergers and restructurings between 
1925 and 1933. While I tried to exclude all cities whose population growth was mostly driven 
by territorial enlargement, a certain arbitrary element remains. When are territorial changes so 
                                                          
18 In the case of the ratio of public employment to total population or the labor force, a slight negative coefficient 
could arise mechanically, as an increase in the share of public employment has to be compensated by all other 
sectors. 
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important that a city is no longer comparable over time? In columns 1-6 of table 9, I repeat the 
analysis of table 7 for two different and somewhat “extreme” samples. In columns 1-3, I do not 
drop any cities, in columns 4-6 I exclude all cities whose growth between either 1910 and 1925, 
1925 and 1933 or 1933 and 1939 exceeded the respective mean by more than one respective 
standard deviation. For convenience, the first stage results are omitted and only the respective 
F statistic is displayed. Compared to the main results in table 7, standard errors increase both 
when including more cities (columns 1-3) and when including fewer (columns 4-6). In the latter 
case, the point estimates are very similar to the main specification, whereas not dropping any 
cities if anything seems to lead to slightly larger point estimates. Overall, however, the 
qualitative conclusions from before do not change, lending support to my hypothesis. 
The validity of using the 1933 NSDAP vote share as explanatory variable might also 
be questioned. I have treated 1939 as the only year after the NSDAP rise to power, taking 1925 
and 1933 to be pre-treatment years. I do this because the first large-scale public investment 
program by the National Socialists, the Rheinhardt program, started in June 1933, few days 
before the 1933 census data were collected, and the expansion of the armed forces occurred 
even later. Against this, one can argue that the National Socialists came to power in January 
1933 and already had a parliamentary majority after March 1933. As shown by Ferguson and 
Voth (2008), shareholders immediately reacted to this change in power, and so therefore might 
have other economic variables. Moreover, the Nazis’ prosecution of their political enemies 
began after the Reichstag Fire in February 1933, which might also have had implications for 
public employment. Similarly, the “Law for the restoration of the professional civil service” 
had already been passed in April 1933. Hence, treating 1933 as a pre-treatment year might be 
problematic, though if anything, it would most likely bias my estimates towards 0.  
In columns 7-9 of table 9, I examine the effect of dropping the potentially confounded 
year 1933, only comparing 1925, a clear pre-treatment year, to 1939, a clear post-treatment 
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year. The results are again very similar to the baseline results and if anything slightly larger, 
which would be in line with the 1933 numbers already being slightly contaminated by the Nazi 
rise to power. However, any such contamination appears to be very limited.  
Another potential problem is the wide definition of public employment that I use 
throughout the analysis. As discussed earlier, creating a consistent measure for 1925, 1933 and 
1939 requires aggregating several occupations, some of which are clearly not part of “public 
employment”. This will increase the noise in my outcome variable and thus impair the precision 
of my estimates, but if these other jobs also react to the Nazi rise to power, it could introduce 
biases. In table 10, I examine the robustness of my results with regards to different outcome 
variables. Such variables do not exist for 1925. In panel A, I focus on variables that exist for 
both 1933 and 1939, panels B and C show results for variables that are only available for 1939. 
In columns 1 and 2 of panel A, I show results for my baseline outcome for 1933 and 1939. For 
brevity, I focus on the natural logarithm of public employment and the ratio of public 
employment to population as outcome variables, omitting the ratio of public employment to 
the labor force which is very highly correlated with ratio out of population. The results when 
using 1933 and 1939 are very similar to the main results in table 7, which is further evidence 
that despite the census the census in 1933 occurring after the election, 1933 is still a valid pre-
treatment year. In columns 3 and 4 then, I use a more narrow public employment definition 
that omits the cinema, theatre and other entertainment occupations. The results are very similar 
to those in columns 1 and 2. In columns 5 and 6, I employ a different outcome variable. Instead 
of trying to get at the public administration sector, I use the occupational class of civil servants 
(Beamte) across all sectors.19 Again, results are very similar: increasing the 1933 NSDAP vote 
                                                          
19 I cannot use 1925 for this regression, since the 1925 census aggregates civil servants with all white-collar 
employees. The 1933 and 1939 civil servant numbers differ slightly in that the former omits the most top-level 
civil servants, but this should be a minor difference. 
 30 
share by one percentage point would lead to an increase in the number of civil servants by 
2.7%, very much in line with the 2.3% in column 2 of this table and column 3 in table 7. 
An even narrower definition of public employment is possible when using data from 
1939 only. In panels B and C of table 10, I show results from cross-sectional regressions for 
the five narrow employment categories that together form my employment definition that is 
consistent across the three censuses. These regressions cannot control for fixed effects and 
therefore rely on stronger identifying assumptions. To at least partly remedy this, I include the 
natural logarithm of a city's population as additional control. In panel B, I show the respective 
ratio of each of the five categories to total population. The overall increase in the ratio of public 
employment to population is driven mostly by public administration and the armed forces. 
Legal and economic counselling and teaching occupations show at most a very slight increase. 
Entertainment does not respond at all, whereas church-related occupations even decrease. Panel 
C, which uses the natural logarithm, by and at large confirms the previous findings. However, 
the estimate for public administration becomes relatively imprecise and loses statistical 
significance. Still, the point estimate of a 3.1% is very similar and if anything slightly larger 
than previous results. Overall, public administration and the armed forces appear to be the 
prime drivers of my measure of public employment. Taken together, the results in table 10 
show that while the aggregation of several occupational classes is undesirable from a 
conceptual point of view, it seems to have little implications for the sign or magnitude of my 
results. 
Conclusion 
Between 1928 and 1933, the NSDAP developed from a small and unimportant party in 
Weimar Germany into the strongest party in the German parliament, making its leader Adolf 
Hitler the head of the German government by January 1933 and gaining a parliamentary 
majority by March of the same year. Hitler used this power not only to concentrate all political 
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competences among his followers, but also to enact large public investment and rearmament 
programs and to overhaul the civil service. In this paper, I document evidence that the public 
employment policies during the early Nazi era were not ideologically color blind. Using a city's 
1912 vote share of the Economic Alliance, a small party in Imperial Germany that catered to 
similar voters as the late NSDAP, as an instrumental variable for the 1933 NSDAP vote share, 
I find that the latter had a positive and significant effect on subsequent public employment at 
the city level. A one percentage point increase in the 1933 vote share caused the number of 
public employment jobs to grow by around 2.5 percent, a finding which is not driven by cities 
undergoing territorial changes, by the inclusion or exclusion of the potentially already 
contaminated census year of 1933, or by the potentially worrisome and unfree 1933 election 
shares and is also robust to using different definitions of public employment as outcome 
variables. This relative increase at the local level is happening as the German economy recovers 
and the number of public employees declines nationwide. My findings show that this decline 
was less pronounced in cities that had voted more for the NSDAP.  
The results of this study shed additional light on the ability of governments to use 
economic policy as a means to reward and protect their voters and supporters, and/or to punish 
their political adversaries. It adds to a growing body of literature that has documented such 
behavior on a firm-level and, to a certain extent, also for individuals. Of course, some 
cautionary remarks apply. In particular, Germany’s Nazi government had stronger powers than 
many modern democratic governments. Being freed of the constraints usually posed by a 
parliamentary opposition, judicial review by courts and a free press, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the National Socialists’ ability to reward a city's loyalty was substantially larger 
than in countries with a stronger opposition.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that one important mechanism behind my finding is the 
preferred allocation of public sector jobs to loyal party stalwarts. This reflected a 
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propagandistic cult around the hardships of the party’s “old guard”, but also the NSDAP’s 
internal structure, which was marked by cliques, where followers expected their superiors to 
reward them in return for their loyalty. Several questions remain in this respect for future 
research: Can this behavior also be documented at the individual level? Were there other 
channels through which public employment was targeted towards cities favoring the Nazis? 
Are there any long-term effects of the increased public employment in the 1930's? Did the 
economic reward for these cities survive the Second World War and persist longer than the 
Nazi government, or did it disappear when the favored party members lost office? And, in a 
broader context, what are the welfare implications of such favoring behavior? In these respects, 
there is substantial scope for further research. 
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Table 1: Assessing outcome variable 
Panel A: Share of the 1939 subcategories in the overall definition of public employment, 
1939 
 Mean Standard deviation 
Public Administration, Armed Forces, Judicature 64.935 13.351 
Teaching and artistic occupations 23.325 8.654 
Church-related occupations 7.079 8.242 
Legal and Economic Counselling 3.094 1.388 
Entertainment (without artists) 1.567 1.050 
Panel B: Share of the 1933 subcategories in the overall definition of public employment, 
1933 
 Mean Standard deviation 
Public Administration, Armed Forces, Church, 
Education 
92.099 3.637 
Entertainment  7.901 3.637 
Panel C: Correlation of  the baseline public employment definition with narrower 
definitions in 1939 (all measures normalized by population 
Public Administration, Armed Forces, Church, 
Education (Census def. 1933) 
1.000 
Public Administration, Armed Forces, Judicature 
(Census def. 1939) 
0.956 
Observations 246 




Table 2: Summary statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Public Employment Level 1925 2,643.36 4,556.11 199.00 38,703.00 
Public Employment Level 1933 3,260.26 5,788.37 234.00 48,687.00 
Public Employment Level 1939 2,843.76 4,484.46 170.00 42,090.00 
Civil Servants Level 1933 2,764.18 4,619.02 173.00 35,786.00 
Civil Servants Level 1939 3,334.58 5,093.96 179.00 43,037.00 
Public Empl. as a percentage share of population 1925 3.93 1.92 1.12 10.84 
Public Empl. as a percentage share of population 1933 4.28 1.94 0.88 10.41 
Public Empl. as a percentage share of population 1939 3.64 1.55 0.84 9.13 
Public Empl. as a percentage share the labor force 1925 8.55 4.48 1.86 24.11 
Public Empl. as a percentage share the labor force 1933 9.57 4.54 2.52 25.12 
Public Empl. as a percentage share the labor force 1939 8.28 3.92 1.93 20.49 
Population 1925 67,770.81 111,899.74 11,782.00 700,222.00 
Population 1933 74,590.57 124,042.81 12,089.00 756,605.00 
Population 1939 81,164.52 128,917.77 12,641.00 829,318.00 
Labor Force 1925 32,748.57 56,838.16 5,440.00 358,477.00 
Labor Force 1933 34,801.27 60,752.12 5,832.00 379,032.00 
Labor Force 1939 37,865.76 63,288.08 6,227.00 432,082.00 
NSDAP Vote share 1933 41.88 8.76 13.65 60.39 
Economic Alliance vote share 1912 1.46 4.49 0.00 37.68 
Unemployment rate 1933 22.28 6.04 5.62 39.23 
Jewish population Share 1925 0.85 0.81 0.01 5.49 
Observations: 246 
Source: Public employment and labor force data for all three years are from Statistisches Reichsamt (1927-28, 1935-36, 1942). Civil servants 
and population in 1939 are from Statistisches Reichsamt (1942). 1912 EA vote share data are from Statistisches Reichsamt (1913) All 
remaining data are based on Falter and Hänisch (1990).
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Table 3: Check for different levels in public employment in 1925 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Public employment 
 Ratio to population Ratio to Labor Force Natural Logarithm 
       
EA vote share 1912 0.003 0.009 -0.002 0.004 -0.013 0.000 
 (0.030) (0.022) (0.067) (0.052) (0.010) (0.005) 
Ln(Population 1925)  -0.323***  -0.936***  0.952*** 
  (0.120)  (0.284)  (0.030) 
Jewish population share 1925  0.614***  1.510***  0.194*** 
  (0.154)  (0.381)  (0.041) 
DRhineland  -1.057***  -1.837**  -0.347*** 
  (0.345)  (0.781)  (0.083) 
Latitude  0.044  0.358*  0.011 
  (0.088)  (0.201)  (0.021) 
Longitude  0.096*  0.247*  0.018 
  (0.057)  (0.131)  (0.013) 
D(Nazi Gau capital)  1.249***  2.839***  0.270*** 
  (0.449)  (1.061)  (0.096) 
Cross-sectional results for 1925 with 246 cities. Controls are the natural logarithm of city population, longitude, latitude, an indicator for the 
Rhineland, an indicator for being a Gau capital, and the Jewish population share in 1925. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: 1912 EA vote share from Statistisches Reichsamt (1913), public employment jobs and labor force from Statistisches Reichsamt 
(1927-28, 1935-36), latitude and longitude from online geocoding tools, Rhineland according to the definition of the Versailles treaty, Nazi 
Gau capitals from Das Buch der Deutschen Gaue (1938), remaining data from Falter and Hänisch (1990) 
 





Table 4: Check for different trends in public employment and other sectors before 1933 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Public employment Share of the LF employed in Share of workers classified as 






Commerce Manuf. Agric. Blue collar White collar Self empl. 
𝐸𝐴𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1912 ⋅ 𝐷1933 0.005 0.036 0.000 0.043 -0.049 -0.001 0.006 0.034 -0.041 
 (0.007) (0.031) (0.002) (0.058) (0.043) (0.011) (0.034) (0.027) (0.025) 
D1933 -0.065 1.202 0.205 23.786*** -29.818*** -2.049 34.835*** -21.415*** -13.420*** 
 (2.269) (4.493) (0.458) (8.080) (8.632) (2.071) (7.926) (6.527) (4.757) 
𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑝. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 25 ⋅ 0.076* 0.189* 0.016 -2.181*** 2.333*** -0.041 0.985*** -0.475** -0.509*** 
𝐷1933 (0.045) (0.096) (0.012) (0.317) (0.336) (0.081) (0.267) (0.191) (0.174) 
𝐷𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 ⋅ 𝐷1933 0.063 -0.023 0.065** -0.355 1.048 0.213 -0.587 -0.150 0.737* 
 (0.126) (0.286) (0.032) (0.716) (0.830) (0.221) (0.653) (0.490) (0.445) 
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 ⋅ 𝐷1933 0.002 -0.017 -0.002 -0.532*** 0.548*** 0.051 -0.533*** 0.418*** 0.116 
 (0.042) (0.085) (0.008) (0.158) (0.173) (0.043) (0.159) (0.123) (0.100) 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 ⋅ 𝐷1933 -0.003 -0.013 -0.001 -0.178* 0.384*** -0.053* 0.062 -0.055 -0.008 
 (0.019) (0.043) (0.004) (0.104) (0.110) (0.028) (0.080) (0.066) (0.047) 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝. 1933 ⋅ 0.011 0.029 0.003 0.155*** -1.123*** 0.021* -0.997*** -0.108*** 0.104*** 
𝐷1933 (0.010) (0.020) (0.002) (0.040) (0.041) (0.012) (0.046) (0.034) (0.035) 
𝐷(𝑁𝑎𝑧𝑖 𝐺𝑎𝑢 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) ⋅ 0.158 0.220 0.012 -0.382 1.005 -0.306** 0.728 -0.623* -0.105 
𝐷1933 
 
(0.100) (0.242) (0.024) (0.593) (0.701) (0.133) (0.476) (0.370) (0.325) 
Panel data results for 1925 and 1933 with 246 cities and 492 observations. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All 
regressions control for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1933 as well as interactions of an indicator for 1933 with an indicator for being a Gau 
capital, the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: 1912 EA vote share from Statistisches Reichsamt (1913), public employment jobs and labor force from Statistisches Reichsamt 
(1927-28, 1935-36), latitude and longitude from online geocoding tools, Rhineland according to the definition of the Versailles treaty, Nazi 
Gau capitals from Das Buch der Deutschen Gaue (1938), remaining data from Falter and Hänisch (1990). 
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Table 5: Relationship between the instrument and the economic crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Unemployment rate 1933 Δ ln(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑)1932−1930 
     
EA vote share 1912 -0.124* -0.066 0.002 0.000 
 (0.068) (0.056) (0.002) (0.003) 
Ln(Population 1933)  2.852***   
  (0.391)   
Jewish pop. share 1925  -1.210***  0.016 
  (0.441)  (0.016) 
DRhineland  4.933***  -0.041 
  (1.116)  (0.039) 
Latitude  0.641***  0.003 
  (0.228)  (0.009) 
Longitude  0.215  -0.014** 
  (0.145)  (0.006) 
D(Nazi Gau capital)  -2.822***  0.039 
  (1.032)  (0.040) 
     
Observations 246 246 201 201 
Cross-sectional results for 1925. Controls are longitude, latitude, an indicator for the 
Rhineland, an indicator for being a Gau capital, and the Jewish population share in 1925. 
Columns 2 also controls for the natural logarithm of city population. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: 1912 EA vote share from Statistisches Reichsamt (1913), latitude and longitude from 
online geocoding tools, Rhineland according to the definition of the Versailles treaty, Nazi Gau 













Table 6: OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Public employment 
 Ratio to Pop. Ratio to LF Natural Log 
    
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ∙ 𝐷1939 -0.007 -0.009 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.003) 
    
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observations. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions control for city fixed effects, 
an indicator for 1939 as well as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being 
a Gau capital, the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, 
latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: 1912 EA vote share from Statistisches Reichsamt (1913), public employment jobs and 
labor force from Statistisches Reichsamt (1927-28, 1935-36, 1942), 1939 population from 
Statistisches Reichsamt (1942), latitude and longitude from online geocoding tools, Rhineland 
according to the definition of the Versailles treaty, Nazi Gau capitals from Das Buch der 
Deutschen Gaue (1938), remaining data from Falter and Hänisch (1990). 
    
 
Table 7: IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: First stage Dep Var: 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ⋅ 𝐷1939 
𝐸𝐴 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1912 ∙ 𝐷1939 0.339*** 
(0.093) 
    
F stat first stage 13.21 
Panel B: 2SLS estimation Public employment 
 Ratio to pop Ratio to LF Natural Log 
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ∙ 𝐷1939 0.098** 0.266** 0.023* 
 (0.049) (0.122) (0.013) 
    
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observations. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions control for city fixed effects, 
an indicator for 1939 as well as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being 
a Gau capital, the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, 
latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  




Table 8: Metal industry 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Metal industry employment 
 Ratio to pop Ratio to LF Natural Log 
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ∙ 𝐷1939 -0.195 -0.401 -0.010 
 (0.149) (0.325) (0.014) 
    
F stat first stage 13.21 
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observations. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions control for city fixed effects, 
an indicator for 1939 as well as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being 
a Gau capital, the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, 
latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: Metal industry employment jobs and labor force from Statistisches Reichsamt (1927-









Table 9: Robustness: City size and dropping 1933 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Public employment 


















          
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 0.130** 0.317** 0.020* 0.103* 0.273* 0.025 0.105** 0.319** 0.023* 
    ⋅ 𝐷1939 (0.062) (0.143) (0.012) (0.060) (0.150) (0.016) (0.048) (0.128) (0.013) 
          
Observations 843 843 843 663 663 663 492 492 492 
Number of cities 281 281 281 221 221 221 246 246 246 
Excludes data from 1933       X X X 
F-stat first stage 14.46 14.46 14.46 10.37 10.37 10.37 13.15 13.15 13.15 
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions control 
for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 as well as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a Gau capital, 
the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland. 
Columns 1-3 do not drop any cities that underwent size changes during the period of observation, columns 4-6 exclude all cities 
whose growth between either 1910 and 1925, 1925 and 1933 or 1933 and 1939 exceeded the respective mean by more than one 
respective standard deviation. Column 7-9 keep the standard set of cities, but exclude data from 1933. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: See note to table 6. 
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Table 10: Robustness: Outcome measure 
Panel A: Panel data 1933 and 1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Public employment 
def. 1925 
Public employment def. 
1933 
Civil servants 












       
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 0.090* 0.023* 0.094* 0.023 0.118** 0.027** 
    ⋅ 𝐷1939 (0.051) (0.014) (0.054) (0.014) (0.053) (0.012) 
       
Observations 492 
F-stat first stage 13.15 
Panel B: Cross-section 1939, ratio of respective occupation group to total population 






      
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 0.120* 0.012 0.004** -0.037*** 0.001 
 (0.070) (0.011) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) 
      
Observations 246 
F-stat first stage 12.35 
Panel C: Cross-section 1939, natural logarithm 






      
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 0.031 0.010 0.032* -0.071** 0.004 
 (0.027) (0.012) (0.017) (0.030) (0.030) 
      
Observations 246 
F-stat first stage 12.35 
Results for 246 cities. Standard errors (panel A: clustered at the city level, panels B and C: 
robust) in parentheses. Panel A regressions control for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 
as well as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a Gau capital, the 
Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, latitude and an indicator 
for being in the Rhineland. Panel B regressions control for the natural logarithm of city 
population, longitude, latitude, an indicator for the Rhineland, an indicator for being a Gau 
capital, the unemployment rate in 1933, and the Jewish population share in 1925. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Figure 1: Changes in public employment between 1925 and 1939 
Note: Hexagons show the location of the cities in my sample. The size of the hexagons represents quintiles of the change in the natural logarithm of the number of public 
employment jobs between 1925 and 1939. County boundaries are based on shapefiles for 1938 Germany from MPIDR (2011). 
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Appendix 
In my empirical strategy, I use several control variables detailed in the data section. Control 
variables are not of interest per se for my study. Moreover, in the absence of a credible 
identification strategy for them, their regression coefficients identify mere conditional correlations 
without a causal interpretation. Because of this, I have omitted them from the main regression 
tables. In table A1 however, I show the basic fixed-effects regression results from table 6, including 
the coefficients for all control variables. Table A2 does the same for the baseline IV estimates of 
table 7. 
Conditional on all the other included variables, latitude and the Jewish population share in 
1925 do not appear to be correlated with public employment. Cities in the East experienced a 
relative decrease of public employment, while the dummy for the Rhineland is actually negative. 
Given the military reoccupation of the Rhineland after 1935, this is surprising, but on the other 
hand, the Rhineland and longitude are strongly negatively correlated, so part of this effect could 
potentially be captured by the longitude coefficient already. Cities with a greater unemployment 
rate in 1933 experience relative increases in public employment jobs in the ratio specifications 
(Columns 1 and 2), but not in the log specification, which indicates that such cities experienced a 
relative population decline. Interestingly, NSDAP Gau capitals experienced declines in public 
employment. One explanation is that most Gau capitals were already regional or state capitals 
before the Nazis had come to power and thus already had sizeable public employment shares 
before, such that they on average experienced less growth.  
Panel A of table A2 shows the correlations of the control variables with the 1933 NSDAP 
vote share. The Jewish population share is positively correlated with voting for the Nazis, as is 
being in the East and North. Being in the Rhineland has a strong negative effect on the 1933 
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NSDAP vote share, which is not surprising given the region's Catholicism and the findings of 
Spenkuch and Tillman (forthcoming). Gau capitals and the 1933 unemployment rate, on the other 
hand, are not found to have statistically significant effects on voting for the Nazis. The negative 
point estimate for the unemployment rate is in line with Falter et al. 1985, who find a negative 
correlation between the unemployment rate and the 1933 NSDAP vote share in a sample of 
precincts. Turning to the IV estimates in panel B, most of the estimates are similar to those in table 
A1:  Latitude turns slightly negative, while the effect of the unemployment rate is again apparently 
due to differential population changes and thus absent in the logarithmic specification. Cities in 
the West still are found to have experienced growth in the public sector, whereas Gau capital cities 
are negatively associated with public employment growth. The one major change of the IV controls 
relative to the OLS controls is that the Rhineland coefficients are now considerably larger in value, 
sometimes even positive, but generally insignificant. Again, it seems that the public employment 














Table A 1: OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Public employment 
 Ratio to 
Population 
Ratio to Labor 
Force 
Natural Log 
    
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1933 ⋅ 𝐷1939 -0.007 -0.009 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.003) 
𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑝. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1925 ⋅ 𝐷1939 -0.006 0.100 0.038 
 (0.090) (0.223) (0.026) 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.038*** 0.067** -0.007* 
 (0.014) (0.031) (0.004) 
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.004 -0.055 0.025** 
 (0.055) (0.120) (0.013) 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 ⋅ 𝐷1939 -0.107*** -0.209** -0.024*** 
 (0.038) (0.087) (0.008) 
𝐷𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 ⋅ 𝐷1939 -0.420* -0.924* -0.126** 
 (0.220) (0.483) (0.060) 
𝐷(𝑁𝑎𝑧𝑖 𝐺𝑎𝑢 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) ⋅ 𝐷1939 -0.507** -1.224** -0.107** 
 (0.208) (0.481) (0.052) 
𝐷1939 0.142 3.500 -0.710 
 (2.808) (6.091) (0.632) 
    
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observations. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions control for city fixed effects, 
an indicator for 1939 as well as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being 
a Gau capital, the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, 
latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: 1912 EA vote share from Statistisches Reichsamt (1913), public employment jobs and 
labor force from Statistisches Reichsamt (1927-28, 1935-36, 1942), 1939 population from 
Statistisches Reichsamt (1942), latitude and longitude from online geocoding tools, Rhineland 
according to the definition of the Versailles treaty, Nazi Gau capitals from Das Buch der 









Table A 2: 2SLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: First stage Dependent Variable: 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ⋅ 𝐷1939 
    
𝐸𝐴 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1912 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.339*** 
 (0.093) 
𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑝. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1925 ⋅ 𝐷1939 1.595** 
 (0.764) 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ⋅ 𝐷1939 -0.127 
 (0.082) 
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.771** 
 (0.330) 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.808*** 
 (0.203) 
𝐷𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 ⋅ 𝐷1939 -4.269** 
 (1.649) 





F stat first stage 13.21 
Panel B: 2SLS estimation Public employment 
 Ratio to Pop. Ratio to LF Natural Log 
    
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒1933 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.098** 0.266** 0.023* 
 (0.049) (0.122) (0.013) 
𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑝. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1925 ⋅ 𝐷1939 -0.193 -0.389 -0.007 
 (0.127) (0.312) (0.034) 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.054*** 0.109** -0.003 
 (0.018) (0.043) (0.005) 
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 ⋅ 𝐷1939 -0.090 -0.300* 0.002 
 (0.076) (0.178) (0.020) 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 ⋅ 𝐷1939 -0.179*** -0.396*** -0.042*** 
 (0.054) (0.135) (0.013) 
𝐷𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.038 0.272 -0.014 
 (0.357) (0.842) (0.097) 
𝐷(𝑁𝑎𝑧𝑖 𝐺𝑎𝑢 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) ⋅ 𝐷1939 -0.541** -1.313** -0.115** 
 (0.220) (0.536) (0.049) 
𝐷1939 1.033 5.829 -0.493 
 (3.446) (7.902) (0.814) 
    
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observations. Robust standard errors, clustered at 
the city level, in parentheses. All regressions control for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 as well as 
interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a Gau capital, the Jewish population in 1925, the 
unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: See note to table A1. 
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Online Appendix A 
The 1925 census of occupations groups the following occupations together (Occupation group 
"D"): Administration, Armed Forces, Church, Free professions (Verwaltung, Heerwesen, Kirche, 
freie Berufe). In 1933, some of these groups are reported separately: Occupation group 51 of the 
1933 census reports the number of people working in jobs related to Administration, Armed 
Forces, Church, Education and others (Verwaltung, Wehrmacht, Kirche, Bildung, Erziehung usw.), 
while occupation group 54 deals with occupations connected to Theatre, Cinemas and Movie 
Recording, Broadcasting, Music, Sports and Showmen (Theater, Lichtspiele und Filmaufnahme, 
Rundfunkwesen, Musikgewerbe, sportliche und Schaustellungsgewerbe). Clearly, the latter group 
is not in the focus of my analysis. However, since these professions are contained in Occupation 
Group D of the 1925 census, I also included them for 1933 and added the Occupation Groups 51 
and 54 of the respective census. 
The 1939 census makes even finer distinctions: Occupation Group 61 deals with 
Administration and Armed Forces (Berufe der öffentlichen Verwaltung und Rechtspflege, der 
Wehrmacht usw), Occupation Group 62 with teaching professions and artists (Lehr- und 
Bildungsberufe, künstlerische Berufe). Church-related professions are reported in Group 63 
(Berufe der Kirche, Mönche und Nonnen), while Group 64 contains professions related to legal 
counselling (Berufe der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsberatung). Group 68 finally contains the 
entertainment industry (Berufe des Unterhaltungsgewerbes (außer Künstler)). Again, a better 
measure would be to only count groups 61 and maybe 62 and 64, but due to the reporting schemes 
in 1925 and 1933, I added up the number of people working in groups 61-64 and 68. 
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Which different sectors and occupations does this aggregate measure contain? The following 
gives an overview of the different subcategories in the 3 censuses. Unfortunately, apart from 1939, 
these subcategories are not reported separately at the city level. 
 1925 
o Occupation Group D: Administration, Armed Forces, Church, Free professions 
(Verwaltung, Heerwesen, Kirche, freie Berufe) 
 W137. National, state, district and municipal administration, judicature (if 
in civil service position), penal system (Reichs-, Landes-, Bezirks- und 
Gemeindeverwaltung, Reichtspflege (soweit in beamteter Stellung) und 
Strafvollzug) 
 W138. Army and navy, army and navy administration (incl. military 
hospitals) (Heer und Marine, Heeres- und Marineverwaltung (einschl. 
Militärlazarette)) 
 W139. Church, divine service, mission, institutions and associations for 
religious purposes (Kirche, Gottesdienst, Mission, Anstalten und Vereine 
für religiöse Zwecke) 
 W140. Education, instruction, libraries, scientific institutes and art 
collections (Bildung, Erziehung, Unterricht, Büchereien, wissenschaftliche 
Institute und Kunstsammlungen) 
 W141. Legal counselling and representation of interests (Rechtsberatung 
und Interessenvertretung) 
 W142. Artists, private scholars, authors (Künstler, Privatgelehrte, 
Schriftsteller) 
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 W143. Theatres and operas, music business (Theater und Opernhäuser, 
Musikgewerbe) 
 W144. Cinemas (Lichtspielwesen) 
 W145. Broadcasting (Rundfunkwesen) 
 W146. Sports business, horse rental, showman business (Sportliche 
Gewerbe, Pferdeverleihung, Schaustellungsgewerbe) 
 1933  
o Occupation Group 51: Administration, Armed Forces, Church, Education and 
others (Verwaltung, Wehrmacht, Kirche, Bildung, Erziehung usw.) 
 511. National, state and municipal administration, public judicature 
(Reichs-, Landes- und Gemeindeverwaltung, öffentliche Rechtspflege) 
 512. Wehrmacht (incl. army and navy administration, naval yard, army and 
navy hospitals etc.) (Wehrmacht (einschl. Heeres- und Marineverwaltung, 
Marinewerft, Heeres- und Marinelazarette usw.)) 
 513. Church, institutions and associations for religious purposes (Kirche, 
Anstalten und Vereine für religiöse Zwecke) 
 514. Education, instruction (Bildung, Erziehung, Unterricht) 
 515. Visual arts, free literary and scientific activity (Bildende Kunst, freie 
schriftstellerische und wissenschaftliche Betägigung) 
 516. Legal and economic counselling, representation of interests (Rechts- 
und Wirtschaftsberatung, Interessenvertretung) 
 517. Residential business (administration incl. allocation) (Wohngewerbe 
(Verwaltung einschl. Vermittlung) 
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o Occupation Group 54: Theatre, Cinemas and Movie Recording, Broadcasting, 
Music, Sports and Showmen Theater, Lichtspiele und Filmaufnahme, 
Rundfunkwesen, Musikgewerbe, sportliche und Schaustellungsgewerbe) 
 1939 
o Occupation Group 61: Occupations in public administration and judicature, 
Wehrmacht etc. (Berufe der öffentlichen Verwaltung und Rechtspflege, der 
Wehrmacht usw) 
o Occupation Group 62: Teaching and instruction occupations, artistic occupations 
(Lehr- und Bildungsberufe, künstlerische Berufe) 
o Occupation Group 63: Occupations in the church, monks and nuns (Berufe der 
Kirche, Mönche und Nonnen) 
o Occupation Group 64: Legal and economic counselling (Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftsberatung) 
o Occupation Group 68: Entertainment occupations (excl. artists) (Berufe des 
Unterhaltungsgewerbes (außer Künstler)) 
To give a sense of what occupation group 61 in 1939 measures, the following professions 
were reported separately at a coarser level (state or Prussian province): Judges and attorneys 
(Richter und Staatsanwälte), trainee judges and civil servants (Regierungs- und 
Gerichtsrefendare), Bailiffs and executory officers (Gerichtsvollzieher, Vollstreckungsbeamte), 
Officers (Wehrmacht) (Offiziere (Wehrmacht)), Non-commissioned officers and long-serving 
privates (Wehrmacht) (Unteroffiziere und langdienende Mannschaften (Wehrmacht)), Leaders and 
trainee leaders of the Reich Labour Service (Reichtsarbeitsdienstführer und - anwärter), Police 
(Polizei- und Gendarmerieoffiziere, Vollzugsbeamte der Ordnungspolizei (ohne Offiziere) and 
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Vollzugsbeamte der Sicherheitspolizei (ohne Offiziere)), fire brigade (without engineers and 
technicians) (Feuerwehrleute (ohne Ingenieure und Techniker)), Leaders and men of the armed 
units of SA and SS (Führer der bewaffneten Einheiten der SS und der SA and Männer der 
bewaffneten Einheiten der SS und der SA), civil servants in administration (if not included in other 
occupations) (Verwaltungsbeamte (soweit nicht in anderen Berufen nachgewiesen)), clerical 
assistants (also department managers) and similar employees in public administration and 
judicature, in the NSDAP, in the public administration of labour and the economy etc (if not 
included in other occupations) (Sachbearbeiter (auch Dienststellen - und Abteilungsleiter u. ähnl. 
Angestl. in der öffentlichen Verwalt. u. Rechtspflege, in der NSDAP, in der öffentl. Arbeits- und 
Wirtschaftslenkung usw. (soweit nicht in anderen Berufen)).  
The largest of these categories are the Wehrmacht and the civil servants in public 
administration. In the whole of Germany, Occupation Group 61 comprised 1,074,571 members in 
1939. Of those, 328,819 were in the Wehrmacht, and 403,019 were Verwaltungsbeamte. Another 
86,848 people belonged to the broad category of Sachbearbeiter (auch Dienststellen - und 
Abteilungsleiter u. ähnl. Angestl. in der öffentlichen Verwalt. u. Rechtspflege, in der NSDAP, in 
der öffentl. Arbeits- und Wirtschaftslenkung usw. (soweit nicht in anderen Berufen). Many of those 
were public administration employees that were not in the civil service (i.e. Angestellte as opposed 
to Beamte). Various police categories accounted for 125,222 members, and the leaders of the Reich 
Labour Service for another 50,767. The armed branches of SA and SS were relatively small outfits, 
amounting to only 29,882 or less than 3% of the whole measure. 
For the regressions where I use the number of civil servants (Beamte) as outcome variables, 
I use the 1933 and 1939 census. In 1933, the respective occupational class is called “civil servants 
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and soldiers, excluding those in senior positions” (Beamte und Soldaten (ohne die in leitender 
Stellung).20 In 1939, the respective category is called “civil servants” (Beamte). 
In table 4, I analyze a city's social class composition, using the categories of blue collar, 
white collar and self-employed. Blue collar is defined to contain laborers (Arbeiter), helping family 
members (Mithelfende Familienangehörige) and domestic workers (Hausangestellte). The white 
collar category contains the census categories of employees (Angestellte) and civil servants 
(Beamte), which are reported separately in 1933 and grouped together in 1925. Self-employed is 
a census category in itself (Selbstständige). In 1933, it also contains high-ranking civil servants 
and officers (Beamte und Offiziere in leitender Stellung). As described in the text, the 1925 census 
does not report the number of people working in each broad category, but the number of workers 
and their dependents, whereas the 1933 census reports the number of people working in each 
category. However, such uniform differences in measurement should be absorbed by the year fixed 
effect. 
Online Appendix B 
In order to address the problem caused by city mergers and restructurings, I analyzed all 
cities whose growth rate between either 1910 and 1925, 1925 and 1933 or between 1933 and 1939 
exceeded the respective mean growth rates by more than one standard deviation. For those cities, 
I examined whether they grew by 25% or more alone because of enlargements. Details about which 
cities or villages were added to the respective cities were obtained from Wikipedia unless stated 
otherwise. The names, population data and sources for the cities are given below. 
                                                          
20 High-ranking civil servants and soldiers are reported with the self-employed, which is why they 
are missing from my measure. 
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From 1925 to 1933, 25 cities exceeded the mean growth rate by more than one standard deviation. 
19 of them were dropped for the following reasons. 
Beuthen's population in 1925 stood at 62,543. Newly added districts had a total population 
of 26,080 in 1925 according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Städte 1928. Hence, Beuthen 
grew by 40% alone due to these acquisitions. Similarly, Bielefeld (population in 1925: 86,062) 
received incorporations totalling a 1925 population of 27,893 (Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher 
Städte 1932), representing a growth of more than 32%. Bochum (population in 1925: 211,249) 
was enlarged through several rounds of incorporations that, according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch 
Deutscher Städte 1929 and 1931, totaled 156,462 and meant that it was dropped from the dataset 
as well. Duisburg incorporated several cities and towns in 1929, including the large city of 
Hamborn. According to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Städte 1930, Hamborn alone led to a 
population growth of more than 46%. Essen grew by 161,977 people or nearly 35% relative to its 
baseline level of 470,525 in 1925. (Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Städte 1931). Gelsenkirchen 
incorporated Buer and other cities in 1928, leading to growth of nearly 60% (Statistisches Jahrbuch 
Deutscher Städte 1930) Hagen's incorporations were as large as 43,900 or 44% of its 1925 
population. Herne incorporated the towns of Börnig, Sodingen, Cray, Oestrich, Bladenhort and 
Holthausen. The 1925 census gives the following numbers for Börnig, Sodingen and Holthausen, 
respectively: 7,979, 8,198, 5,942. The other villages are not listed and hence must have been 
smaller than 2,000 inhabitants. Still, even without them, the three larger ones totaled 22,119 
people, which represents a 32% increase in population for Herne. Hindenburg in 1927 acquired 
several surrounding towns and municipalities, growing by nearly 69% (Statistisches Jahrbuch 
Deutscher Städte 1928). Luenen acquired Brambauer and parts of another town, Derne. Brambauer 
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alone led to growth of around 56%. Neustrelitz, a town of 12,260 inhabitants in 1925, was merged 
with Strelitz, thereby gaining 4,687 inhabitants as of 1925, or 38%. Oberhausen incorporated 
several surrounding entities, totaling 84,466 according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher 
Städte 1931, or nearly 80% of the city's 1925 population. The towns of Lennep and Lüttringhausen 
(together 27,826 according to the 1925 census) were added to Remscheid, making it grow by 36%. 
Rheine had a 1933 population of 17,732. According to the homepage of the administrative district 
of Münster (of which the city is a part), the city acquired additional territory in 1929 that made its 
population grow by about 10,000 inhabitants. Bad Salzemen (9,998) and Frohse (2,064, both 
numbers according to the 1925 census) were added to Schönebeck, which as a consequence grew 
by 56%. Solingen's 1925 population was more than doubled by the acquisition of Gräfrath, 
Höhscheid, Ohligs and Wald, totaling 83,799 inhabitants (Census of population 1925). Several 
towns were incorporated into Wiesbaden, making its 1925 population of 102,737 grow by 30,684 
or nearly 30% according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Städte (1928). Witten's population 
in 1925 stood at 45,295. Annen, Stockum, Düren and parts of Langendreer and Bommern were 
added to this. While Düren is missing from the 1925 census list and hence must have had less than 
2,000 inhabitants, Annen and Stockum had 1925 populations of 17,822 and 3,196, respectively. 
Zweibrücken received the villages of Bubenhausen and Ernstweiler. Bubenhausen's population as 
of 1925 was 3,817, or 24% of Zweibrücken's in the same year. For Ernstweiler, the census contains 
no population data. However, even under a very conservative assumption of only 200 inhabitants, 
the two acquisitions would exceed the 25% threshold, so Zweibrücken was also dropped. 
Six cities were not dropped, although they experienced substantial territorial gains. 
 Dortmund, with a 1925 population of 321,743, received additional incorporations totaling 
70,491 according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Städte 1931, or 22%. Similarly, 
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Eschweiler received the surrounding villages of Nothberg, Hastenrath and Scherpenseel. Nothberg 
and Hastenrath are listed in the 1925 census as having populations of 2.176 and 2.187, while 
Scherpenseel had less than 2,000 inhabitants. Even under the conservative assumption that it was 
exactly at this cut-off, the sum of the three gains would total only 6.363, or 24% of Eschweiler's 
1925 population. Ellguth-Zabrze (2.205), Sosnitza (6.453), Richtersdorf (3.661) and Zernik 
(2.083, all figures from the 1925 census) were made part of Gleiwitz, making its 1925 population 
grow by 17.5%. Heilbronn experienced substantial population growth between 1925 and 1933, but 
I could not find any evidence for territorial gains. Mainz acquired Bretzenheim (5.692), Weisenau 
(6.637), Ginsheim (4.611), Bischofsheim (5.438) and Gustavsburg (below 2.000, all figures from 
1925 census). Even if Gustavsburg's population had been at 2.000, this would have resulted in 
growth of 22.5% relative to the 1925 level. Euren, Biewer, Kürenz, Olewig and a part of Pallien 
were made part of Trier (1925 population: 58.140). The 1925 census gives the population of Euren 
and Kürenz as 3.248 and 4.268, respectively; Biewer, Pallien and Olewig are not listed and hence 
must have been smaller than 2.000 inhabitants. However, even under the most conservative 
assumption that they each had exactly 2.000 inhabitants, the sum of the added populations would 
only reach 23% of Trier's 1925 population. 
Between 1933 and 1939, 15 cities exceeded the mean growth rate by more than one 
standard deviation. Seven of them were dropped. 
 In a large-scale reorganization, the cities of Altona, Wandsbek and Harburg-Wilhelmsburg 
were added to Hamburg (1,129,307). Their population as of 1933 stood at 400,818. Potsdam (1933 
population: 73,676) acquired several surrounding towns, including Nowawes (1933 population: 
29,229). Radebeul (1933 population: 12,949) was merged with Kötschenbroda (1933 population: 
18,909). Weingarten (8,385 according to the census of occupation 1933) was incorporated into 
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Ravensburg (18,930) in 1939, making the latter grow by 44%. Stolberg (17,394) acquired parts of 
Büsbach, Eilendorf and Eschweiler, whose total is given as 12,199 by the census 1933. In a curious 
reorganization, Rüstringen (48,562 in 1933 according to the census) was added to Wilhelmshaven 
(1933: 28,016). Zweibrücken was dropped already because of its large growth between 1925 and 
1933.  
Eight cities were not dropped. 
 For Neubrandenburg, Oranienburg and Swinemünde, I could not find any evidence of 
territorial gains. Cuxhaven acquired Groden (1,678), Westerwisch and Süderwisch (864), 
Stickenbüttel (644), Duhnen (725) and Neuwerk with Scharhörn (63), totalling nearly 18% of its 
1933 population of 22,234. Dessau incorporated Rosslau, Jonitz and Naundorf. The latter had been 
excorporated just before the 1933 census and were then reincorporated in 1935. Their respective 
populations according to the 1933 census stood at 12,845, 1,721 and 527, which represents a 
growth of around 19% relative to Dessau's 1933 population of 78634. Landau acquired 
Queichsheim and Mörlheim, totaling 3,013 inhabitants or 18% of Landau's 1933 population (all 
data from the 1933 census). Suhl (15477) acquired Heinrichs. Heinrichs' population as of 1925 
was 2,895, which would mean a growth of 18.7%. Even if Heinrichs experienced further growth 
between 1925 and 1933, it is very unlikely that it would exceed the 25% threshold, so I did not 
drop Suhl. Wittenberg incorporated Teuchen and Labetz in 1938. Both towns are not listed in the 
1925 census and hence together cannot have exceeded 4,000 inhabitants in 1925. Given 
Wittenberg's 1925 population of 23,457, the two towns fell considerably short of the 25% threshold 
in 1925, and it is highly unlikely that they grew so fast as to exceed it in 1933, when Wittenberg's 
population stood at 24,480.  
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Between 1910 and 1925, 25 cities exceeded the mean growth rate by more than one standard 
deviation. 13 of them were dropped. 
Berlin experienced a massive increase in area and population due to the Greater Berlin Act 
of 1920. Gera (1910 population according to the census: 49,276) acquired a vast number of 
surrounding towns and villages. Four of them alone (Debschwitz, Untermhaus, Pforten and 
Zwötzen) had a combined 1910 population of 23,967, leading Gera to be dropped. Greiz was 
enlarged by the acquisition of Pohlitz, Dölau and several smaller villages. The two former alone 
had a combined population of 6,025, enlarging Greiz's 1910 population of 23,245 by more than 
25%. Hirschberg with its 1910 population of 20,564 acquired several smaller towns and 
Kunnersdorf/Cunnersdorf according to Salomon and Stein (1928), which in 1910 had a population 
of 5,411, making the city grow by more than 25% alone. Osternburg and Eversten were added to 
Oldenburg, boosting that city's population by more than 66% at 1910 levels. Pirna's population in 
1910 stood at 19,525. Between then and 1925, several towns and villages were incorporated into 
it, and the incorporation of Copitz and Neundorf alone added nearly 45% of the city's 1910 
population to it. Similarly, Riesa incorporated Gröba, Oberreussen and Weida. While Oberreussen 
had less than 2,000 inhabitants in 1910, Gröba and Weida had 4,471 and 2,119, respectively, or 
43% of Riesa's 1910 population of 15,287. Waldenburg incorporated several minor districts and 
villages and Altwasser, which by itself increased Waldenburg's population by 88% in 1910 terms. 
Wattenscheid was considerably enlarged after 1926. While the Hänisch-Falter database contains 
data for the enlarged city in 1925, the 1910 census and 1912 election results refer to the original, 
small city only, which was therefore dropped. The same holds for Castrop-Rauxel, which was 
created in 1926 through a merger of Castrop, Rauxel and other municipalities. Bochum, Essen and 
Luenen were already dropped due to their enlargements between 1925 and 1933 or 1933/39. 
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12 Cities were not dropped.  
In the case of Ahlen, Bottrop, Datteln, Gladbeck, Herten, Marienburg, Recklinghausen and 
Schneidemühl, I did not find any evidence for territorial acquisitions, their growth seems to have 
been purely organic. Dortmund acquired Deusen, Dorstfeld, Eving, Huckarde, Kemminghausen, 
Lindenhorst, Rahm, Wischlingen, Brackel and Wambel, of which Deusen, Kemminghausen, 
Rahm and Wischlingen had fewer than 2,000 inhabitants in 1910. Even under the extreme 
assumption that they had exactly 2,000 inhabitants, the total growth due to the acquisition of all 
10 towns would have amounted to only 23%, so Dortmund was not dropped. Similarly, Hannover 
acquired Linden, but thereby growing only by 24%. Similarly, Schweinfurt incorporated 
Oberndorf, but this only represented a growth of around 15% at 1910 levels. The most difficult 
case is Regensburg. Its population in 1910 stood at 52,624. Between then and 1925, it acquired 
Stadtamhof (4,369) and Steinweg (3,575) as well as 5 villages that had fewer than 2,000 inhabitants 
in 1910. If these 5 villages had a total population of more than 5,212 inhabitants, Regensburg's 
inorganic growth would have exceeded 25% and I would have dropped the city. However, in the 
respective district of Oberpfalz, the 1910 census gives the average population of all villages below 
2,000 inhabitants as 395, so the 5 villages combined would have had to exceed this average by 
more than a factor of 2.5 to reach 5,212 inhabitants, which seems unlikely. I therefore decided to 
not drop Regensburg.  
Online Appendix C 
In this appendix, I present several additional results.  
One could argue that the 1933 election was not the election that brought Hitler into power, 
it was only the one that gave him a parliamentary majority. Additionally, since the election 
happened after the Reichstag Fire and the subsequent prosecution of Communists, it is 
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questionable whether this election was really a free one. In table C1, I redo the analysis of table 7, 
but use the NSDAP vote shares in the election in September 1930, July 1932, and November 1932 
as main explanatory variables. While data for the 1930 election are available for all cities in my 
sample, the results for the 1932 elections were unfortunately only reported at the district level. I 
therefore run these regressions only on a limited sample that includes cities that were also a district 
(Stadtkreise, as opposed to cities that were part of a Landkreis), which decreases the sample size 
by around one third. Still, the results from table C1 confirm the previous results, both in terms of 
sign and magnitude and indicate that there is a positive relationship between voting shares for the 
NSDAP and subsequent public employment. In addition, the first stage F statistics show that the 
relationship between the 1912 EA vote shares and the later NSDAP vote shares is stronger in 1932 
than in 1930. This is consistent with the NSDAP becoming more and more attractive for the 
nationalist lower middle class voters to whose preferences the constituent parties of the Economic 
Association had catered in Imperial Germany 20 years earlier. 
A further robustness check is motivated by figure 1, which shows a slight concentration of 
large public employment increases in Central Germany. Because of this, controlling for longitude 
or latitude in a linear form might not be sufficient. Table C2 shows results when additionally 
controlling for the square of longitude and latitude (interacted with a dummy for Post-1939). If 
anything, allowing for a nonlinear effect of geography strengthens my results: Point estimates 
increase, the first stage becomes more powerful, and the standard errors decrease slightly. 
In table C3, I repeat the robustness check of columns 1-6 of table 9 for the “Placebo check” 
in table 8 Generally, the point estimates increase in absolute value, but their precision either stays 
relatively unchanged (columns 1-3) or decreases (columns 4-6). As a result, there is still no 
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statistically significant effect to be seen, but the relative imprecision of the estimates makes it hard 
to draw any firm conclusions. 
Finally, as mentioned in the main text, the instrumental variable I use has a somewhat 
unusual distribution: In 191 cities, the EA did not run or did not receive any votes in 1912. In the 
remaining 55 cities, the mean vote share was 3.12% (standard deviation 6.54). Four cities recorded 
particularly high EA vote shares of more than 20%, the extreme case being Siegen with more than 
37%. The spike at 0 and the presence of potentially influential variables on the right tail of the 
instrument's distribution may mask some heterogeneity in the effect. This is further explored in 
table C4. Focusing on the natural logarithm of public employment and on its ratio out of the 
population as outcome variables, I show IV results for several subsamples, and show how the IV 
coefficient depends on its two constituents, the reduced form (effect of the 1912 EA share on the 
outcome) and the first stage. Columns 1 and 5 show the results for the baseline of 246 cities, 
reproducing the main results from table 7. In columns 2 and 6, I focus on the 55 cities that had 
nonzero EA vote shares in 1912. Naturally, the precision decreases when dropping 75% of the 
sample, and the first stage F statistic is weakened. The size of the first stage coefficient decreases, 
indicating that among the cities where the EA ran in 1912, the translation from EA vote shares to 
1933 NSDAP vote shares is smaller. Because of this and a slight increase in the reduced form, the 
effect size for these cities increases. In columns 3 and 7, I keep the cities with no EA vote share, 
but drop the four cities with EA vote shares larger than 20. They represent around 1.5% of all 
cities, but more than 7% of all those with values larger than 0. Now, the reduced form decreases, 
while the first stage becomes less precise, but larger in absolute value, both of which leads to 
smaller effect sizes. Finally, in columns 4 and 8, I drop both the four cities with large EA vote 
shares and all the cities with no EA voting. The first stage coefficient in this sample is very close 
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to the baseline, but the reduced form is larger, leading to overall larger effect sizes. Overall, the 
cities with zero EA votes in 1912 are important for the precision of the estimate. However, they 
tend to decrease the reduced form and increase the coefficient of the first stage, thereby dampening 
the effect. The four cities with very large EA vales are quite influential in the overall regression, 
increasing the reduced form and decreasing the first stage and thus increasing overall estimates, as 
can be seen when comparing columns 1 and 5 to 3 and 7. Among cities with positive EA vote 
shares, those four cities are more influential for the first stage, tilting its slope closer towards 0 
(columns 2/6 vs. 4/8). Finally, as columns 4 and 8 show, when focusing on a very limited sample 
of only cities that have positive EA shares below 20%, i.e. excluding both extremes, precision is 
low, but the qualitative conclusions remain the same as in the full sample. 
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Table C 1: Different elections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Public employment 


















          
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1932 ⋅ 0.158* 0.429* 0.037       
𝐷1939 (0.090) (0.225) (0.024)       
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦 1932 ⋅    0.090** 0.235** 0.025**    
𝐷1939    (0.038) (0.105) (0.010)    
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑁𝑜𝑣 1932 ⋅       0.103** 0.268** 0.028** 
𝐷1939       (0.046) (0.129) (0.012) 
          
Observations 738 738 738 480 480 480 483 483 483 
Number of cities 246 246 246 160 160 160 161 161 161 
F-stat first stage 7.200 7.200 7.200 10.11 10.11 10.11 9.591 9.591 9.591 
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions control 
for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 as well as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a Gau capital, 
the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, latitude and an indicator for being in the Rhineland. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: 1912 EA vote share from Statistisches Reichsamt (1913), public employment jobs and labor force from Statistisches 
Reichsamt (1927-28, 1935-36, 1942),1939 population from Statistisches Reichsamt (1942), latitude and longitude from online 
geocoding tools, Rhineland according to the definition of the Versailles treaty, Nazi Gau capitals from Das Buch der Deutschen 
Gaue (1938), remaining data from Falter and Hänisch (1990). 
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Table C 2: Controlling for second-order polynomials in longitude and latitude 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Public employment 
 Ratio to Pop Ratio to LF Natural Log 
    
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.097** 0.260** 0.026** 
 (0.043) (0.107) (0.012) 
    
F-stat first stage 16.03 
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939, 246 cities and 738 observations. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions control for city fixed effects, 
an indicator for 1939 as well as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being 
a Gau capital, the Jewish population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, the 
square of longitude, latitude, the square of latitude, and an indicator for being in the Rhineland. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: See notes to table C1. 
 
 
Table C 3: Robustness of the metal industry estimates: Robustness to city size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Metal industry employment 












       
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ⋅ -0.204 -0.439 -0.017 -0.236 -0.494 -0.018 
𝐷1939 (0.137) (0.302) (0.015) (0.186) (0.406) (0.016) 
       
Observations 843 843 843 663 663 663 
Number of cities 281 281 281 221 221 221 
F-stat first stage 14.46 14.46 14.46 10.37 10.37 10.37 
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, 
in parentheses. All regressions control for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 as well as 
interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a Gau capital, the Jewish 
population in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, latitude and an indicator for 
being in the Rhineland. Columns 1-3 do not drop any cities that underwent size changes during 
the period of observation, columns 4-6 exclude all cities whose growth between either 1910 
and 1925, 1925 and 1933 or 1933 and 1939 exceeded the respective mean by more than one 
respective standard deviation. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: Metal industry employment jobs and labor force from Statistisches Reichsamt (1927-
28, 1935-36, 1942). All other variables see notes to table C1. 
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Table C 4: IV value depending on subsamples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: 2SLS estimates Ratio of public employment to population Natural logarithm of public employment 
         
𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.098** 0.257* 0.048 0.175 0.023* 0.086** 0.010 0.064** 
 (0.049) (0.147) (0.049) (0.118) (0.013) (0.040) (0.012) (0.033) 
         
Panel B: Reduced Form Ratio of public employment to population Natural logarithm of public employment 
         
𝐸𝐴 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1912 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.033** 0.048*** 0.029 0.065* 0.008* 0.016*** 0.006 0.024*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.028) (0.036) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
         
Panel C: First stage 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1933 ⋅ 𝐷1939 
         
𝐸𝐴 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 1912 ⋅ 𝐷1939 0.339**
* 
0.187** 0.606*** 0.373** 0.339*** 0.187** 0.606*** 0.373** 
 (0.093) (0.088) (0.143) (0.165) (0.093) (0.088) (0.143) (0.165) 
         
F-stat first stage 13.21 4.564 17.87 5.123 13.21 4.564 17.87 5.123 
Observations 738 165 726 153 738 165 726 153 
Number of cities 246 55 242 51 246 55 242 51 
Sample All 
cities 
%EA> 0 %EA < 20 0 <%EA< 
20 
All cities %EA> 0 %EA < 20 0 <%EA< 
20 
Panel data results for 1925, 1933 and 1939. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. All regressions control 
for city fixed effects, an indicator for 1939 as well as interactions of an indicator for 1939 with an indicator for being a Gau capital, 
the Jewish population share in 1925, the unemployment rate in 1933, longitude, latitude, and an indicator for being in the Rhineland. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: See note to table C1. 
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